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Stanaland: Estate Tax

NOTE
VALUATION DISCOUNTS
AFTER ESTATE OF NOWELL v.
COMMISSIONER: A CLEAR
FORMULA FOR REDUCING
ESTATE TAXES
I. INTRODUCTION

In Estate of Nowell v. Commissioner,l the Tax Court considered the issue of valuation discounts 2 on property for purposes
of calculating federal estate and gift tax liability.3 In its
memorandum opinion, the court held that transferred property
is. valued without considering other similar property held by
either the transferor or transferee for estate and gift tax pur4
.
poses.
The Nowell decision provided two important rules. First, a
family may transfer property to various trusts and then claim
that the total value of all trusts is worth less than the value of
the underlying property because each trust owns only a partial
share of the property.s This is true even when the family still
owns and controls the trusts and, therefore, owns and controls

1

77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1239 (1999).

2
3

See infra notes 35 - 83 and accompanying text.

4

See id.

See Estate of Nowell, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1242 (1999).

S See

id.

679
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all the property.6 Second, Nowell provides an additional valuationdiscount when an interest in a limited partnership is
transferred and the transferee is treated as an assignee' as
opposed to a substitute limited partner. 8 This discount is
available even when the transferee owns one hundred percent
of the remaining partnership, making the distinction between
an assignee and a full partner irrelevant. 9
Part II of this note will discuss the relevant law as it existed at the time Nowell was decided. Parts III and IV will
then describe the circumstances surrounding the case and how
it came to be heard by the court. Next, Part V will offer an explanation of the Tax Court's analysis, which will then be critiqued and supported in Part VI. Part VII will conclude this
note by discussing a method by which to use the Nowell case to
obtain maximum valuation discounts in estate planning.
To begin, it is important to note that Nowell is a Tax Court
Memorandum case. 10 Generally, when the Tax Court designates a ruling as a "memo case," the case is simply restating
existing law and does not set new precedent. l l The case still
carries the usual precedential value, but its value is lessened
by its reiterative nature. 12 This classification, however, has not
always been strictly followed. IS The court may have used the
memorandum designation in Nowell because it ruled only on
cross-motions for partial summary judgment; nevertheless,
Nowell is important for providing a bright-line rule for struc-

6

.

See id.

7

The distinction between an assignee and a partner is important because, in general, an assignee cannot exercise the normal rights of a partner. An assignee has only
the right to the distribution of income from the partnership. An assignee can neither
interfere in the management of the busine8s nor require any information or account of
partnership transaction8. See 59A AM. JUR. 2d Partnerships § 506 (1987).
8
See Estate ofNowell, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1243 (1999).
9 See id.
10
11
12

IS

See id. at 1239.
See WILLIAM A RAABE ET AL., WEST'S FEDERAL TAX RESEARCH 117 (2d ed. 1987).
See id.
See id.
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turing estate plans to obtain the maximum valuation
discount. 14

II. BACKGROUND
A federal transfer tax is imposed on both the gifts a person
makes during his or her life and the assets transferred at
death. 16 Prior to 1976, two independent systems existed for
calculating this estate tax: one for taxing the value of assets
transferred at death and another for taxing inter-vivos transfers. 16 In 1976, Congress combined the two methods into a single unified gift and estate tax system, which today imposes a
tax on the inter-vivos and testamentary transfer of wealth by
every citizen or resident of the United States. 17 Only gifts valued at more than $10,000 per donee during a single calendar
year are subject to tax; gifts valued at less than $10,000 per
donee per year are exempt. IS Because a person can make gifts
to an unlimited number of donees each year, this annual exclu19
sion is a much-used planning tool for reducin~ estate taxes.
In calculating the estate tax, every decedent is allowed a
unified credit20 against the tax. 21 For 1999, this unified credit

14
16
16

See Estate of NoweU, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1243 (1999).
See RoBERT A ESPERTI ET AL., GENERATIONS - PLANNING YOUR LEGACY 7 (1999).

See DOUGLAS A KAHN ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF TRUSTS AND ESTATES, 2 (3d

ed.1997)
17

See I.R.C. § 2oo1(a) (1999). "A tax is hereby imposed on the transfer of the taxable estate of every decedent who isa citizen or resident of the United States." Id.
IS

See I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1999). Exclusion from gifts In General - In the case of gifts (other than gifts of future interests in property)
made to any person by the donor during the calendar year, the first $10,000 of such
gifts to such person shall not, for purposes of subsection (a), be included in the total
amount of gifts made during such year.
Id.
~

.

For example, if a husband and wife have four married children, the husband and
wife could each make a gift of $10,000 to each child and to each child's spouse. This
would allow the husband and wife to reduce their taxable estate by $160,000 each
year. See I.R.C. § 2503(b).
20
Unified Credit Against Estate Tax is the title of I.R.C. § 2010, hence the term,
"unified credit." However, in amendments to section 2010 in 1997 Congress uses the
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eliminated the transfer tax on the first $650,000 of the estate
22
and cumulative gifts of each decedent. The credit amount
increased to $675,000 in 2000 and increases in years thereafter
until 2006 when the maximum credit will be $1,000,000. 23
When the value of the estate and all taxable lifetime transfers exceed the amount of the unified credit, the unified gift
and estate tax is imposed on the excess.24 The tax rate begins
at thirty-seven percent and increases to a maximum rate of
fifty-five percent when the estate is valued at $3,000,000. 25
These taxes, however, are not applied to the transfer by a
decedent to the surviving spouse when the marital deduction is
used. 26 That is, if certain requirements are met, transfers to a
spouse are deducted from the value of the decedent's estate
27
and thus not subject to the unified estate and gift tax. One

term "applicable credit amount." I.R.C. § 2010(c). It is possible the term "unified
credit" will be replaced with "applicable credit." I.R.C. § 2010 (c) (1999).
21

See I.R.C. § 2010(a) (1999). "A credit of the applicable credit amount shall be allowed to the estate of every decedent against the tax imposed by section 2001." [d.
22
23

See I.R.C. § 2010(c).
See id.

In the case of a decedent
dying and gifts made, during:
1998
1999
2000 and 2001
2002 and 2003
2004
2005
2006 or thereafter

The applicable
exclusion amount is:
$625,000
$650,000
$675,000
$700,000
$850,000
$950,000
$1,000,000

24 See I.R.C. § 2001(c) (1999).
25

See I.R.C. § 2001(c) (1999).

26

See I.R.C. § 2056(a) (1999).
Allowance of Marital Deduction - For purposes of the tax imposed by section 2001,
the value of the taxable estate shall, except as limited by subsection (b), be determined
by deducting from the value of the gross estate an amount equal to the value of any
interest in property which passes to or has passed from the decedent to his surviving
spouse, but only to the extent that such interest is included in determining the value
of the gross estate.

[d.
27

See I.R.C. § 2056(a).
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requirement, called the terminable interest rule, is that the
interest passing to the surviving spouse must pass freely and
must not terminate or pass to another party unless the surviving spouse decides to do SO.28 The legislature, however, created a significant exception to this terminable interest rule for
qualified terminable interest property ("QTIP"), which does not
pass freely.29 If the estate makes an election on the estate tax
return to have the property treated as QTIP property, it will be
treated as passing to the surviving spouse even though the
surviving spouse has only a life interest, which extinguishes on
the death of the surviving spouse, and no power to designate
the beneficiaries. 30 When a QTIP election is made, the property qualifies for the marital deduction and, therefore, is not
taxed in the estate of the first-to-die. 31 Absent a statute to the
contrary, logic would not require the property to be taxed in
the surviving spouse's estate because the surviving spouse only
holds a life interest in the property.32 The legislature, how-

28

See I.R.C. § 2056(b).
General Rule - Where, on the lapse of time, or the occurrence of an event or contingency, or on the failure of an event or contingency to occur, an interest passing to the
surviving spouse will terminate or fail, no deduction shall be allowed under this section with respect to such interest.
[d.

29 See I.R.C. § 2056(bX7).

In General - In the case of qualified terminable interest property - for purposes of
subsection (a), such property shall be treated as passing to the surviving spouse and,
for purposes of paragraph (1XA), no part of such property shall be treated as passing
to any person other than the surviving spouse. Qualified Terminable Interest Property
Defined. - For purposes of this paragraph - In General - The term "qualified terminable interest property" means property - which passes from the decedent. in which the
surviving spouse has a qualifying income interest for life, and to which an election
under this paragraph applies. Qualifying Income Interest for Life. The surviving
spouse has a qualifying income interest for life if - the surviving spouse is entitled to
all the income from the property, payable annually or at more frequent intervals, or
has a usufruct interest for life in the property, and no person has a power to appoint
any part of the property to any person other than the surviving spouse. [d.
30 See ill. QTIP elections are typically used when there is a second marriage and
children from the first marriage. The decedent wishes to provide income to the second
spouse but ensure the children from a prior marriage receive an inheritance. See
Kahn, supra note 16, at 292.

31

See I.R.C. § 2056(bX7) (1999).
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ever, enacted such a statute to the contrary with section 2044
of the Internal Revenue Code (IR.C.), which ensures that the
property does not escape the transfer tax. 33 This section requires that the estate of the surviving spouse include the value
of the QTIP property even though the surviving spouse held
only an income interest that was extinguished on his or her
death. 34
A. PLANNING TO REDUCE ESTATE TAXES
1. Family Limited Partnerships

While taxes generally discourage large gifts, the use of
family limited partnerships as a planning tool facilitates
them. 36 When used for estate planning, two family members,
typically a husband and wife, form a partnership and contribute assets. 56 The partners can then make annual gifts of ownership interests in the partnership worth $10,000 to their children instead of making gifts of the underlying assets owned by
the partnership.57 Numerous advantages in using this family
limited partnership tool include the following: 36 a) parents are
able to maintain complete control over the underlying assets if
they own all of the general partnership interests; b) the parents can pay themselves most or all of the income from the

32

See Terry S. Jones, Comment, Estate of Bonner v. United States: QTIPS and
Fractional Interest Discounts: Whipsaw Wonderland, 33 IDAHO L. REv. 595, 608 - 609
(1997).

sa

See I.R.C. § 2044 (1999). This code section simply states that if the QTIP election
is made on the estate tax return of the first spouse-to-die, then the property must be
included in the estate of the second spouse-to-die:
(a) The value of the gross estate shall include the value of any property to which
this section applies in which the decedent had a qualifying interest for life.
(b) This section applies to any property ifa deduction was allowed with respect t the transfer of such property to the decedent
under section 2056 by reason of subsection (bX7) thereof.... Id.
34 See id.
35
36

37
3S

See Esperti, supra note 15, at 271.
S ee id .
See id. at 272.

See id .
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partnership because they manage the partnership; c) the partnership interests given as gifts are subject to valuation discounts; d) the limited partners have limited liability.
The effect of the family limited partnership is that donors
reduce the value of the assets in their estate on death, while
maintaining control over and income from the assets during
39
their lives. Additionally, donors may distribute the limited
partnership assets to the intended heirs and provide a plan of
succession for the ownership of the businesses. 40 Family disagreements over ownership may also be reduced when assets
are transferred during the parent's life. 41

2. Valuation Discounts
Valuation discounts may be used to reduce the value of assets and the corresponding tax liability.42
The Treasury
Regulations define the value of property as the fair market
value, which is "the price at which the property would change
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither
being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having
reasonable knowledge of relevant facts. n43 In considering the
fair market value, the regulations require the tax return filer
to consider, "[all] relevant facts and elements of value as of the
applicable valuation date ...."" For exapmple, if less than
one hundred percent of an asset is transferred, the valuation of
the transferred interest may be decreased by considering such
factors as lack of control, inability to influence day-to-day
management, liquidation rights, distribution of profits, and

39 See

id. at 274 - 275.

40 See

Esperti, supra note 15, at 274-275.

41

See id. at 274 - 275.

42 See Sharon J. Ritter, A Historical Perspective on Minority Discounts, 82 TAX
NOTES ToDAY 1993, 1993 (1999).

43 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965). "The value of every item of
property includible in a decedent's gross estate under section 2031 through 2044 is its
fair market value at the date of death .... " Id.
44 Id.
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voting power.46 These particular factors gave rise to the concept of minority interest discounts,46 which is one way to reduce the value of transferred property.·7 It is important to
note, however, that because families frequently transfer interests in closely held companies between family members for less
than fair market v~ue, the IRS closely scrutinizes the value
placed on the interests transferred. 48
Valuation can be difficult depending on the type of
property:9 Real property and publicly traded securities are
relatively easy to value because there is a market where buyers and sellers engage in frequent transactions. 60 Closely held
businesses, on the other hand, are more difficult to value because there are few owners and sales are infrequent. 61 The
Treasury Regulations, nevertheless, offer some .guidelines. 62
For example, Treasury Regulation § 20.2031-3 states that
valuation of the goodwill of the business requires special atten. 63
t Ion.

45

See Ritter, supra note 44, at 193.

46

See infra notes 55 - 63 and accompanying text.

47 See Ritter, supra note 44, at 193. For example, if a piece of real estate is worth
$100,000 a ten percent interest in that real estate is not worth $10,000 because the
owner of the ten percent interest cannot force a sale of the property, cannot demand
distributions of profits, or otherwise control and manage the property. See id.
48 See id.
49

See id.

60

See id.

61See

Ritter, supra note 44, at 193.

See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-3 (as amended in 1992).
The net value is determined on the basis of all relevant factors including A fair appraisal as of the applicable valuation date of all the assets of the business,
tangible and intangible, including goodwill;
The demonstrated earning capacity of the business; and
The other factors set forth in paragraphs (0 and (h) of § 20.2031-2 relating to the
valuation of corporate stock, to the extent applicable."
62

[d.
63

See id. Although no definition for goodwill is provided by either the I.R.C. or the
regulations, I.R.C., section 197(d) categorizes goodwill with going concern value,
workforce in place, etc., thereby implying that goodwill is the same as going concern
value, workforce in place, etc. From an accounting standpoint, goodwill is defined as

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol30/iss3/8
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The use of family limited partnerships, combined with
valuation discounts, provide planning opportunities to significantly reduce estate taxes.54 Some of the more commonly used
discounts include minority interest discounts, lack of marketability discounts, liquidation discounts and fractional interest
discounts, each of which are discussed more fully below:
a. Minority Discounts
A person owning less than a majority of the managing interest cannot control or have a meaningful voice in the management of the assets. 56 This minority interest gives rise to the
minority discount, which is based on factors such as lack of
control, inability to influence day-to-day management, lack of
liquidation rights, lack of control over distribution of profits;
and limited voting power. 56
These minority discounts are
available on both transfers at death and inter-vivos gifts. 57
However, the minority discount is not automatic. 58 A discount
may be disallowed if the transferor made the transfer solely to
fragment control over a block of stock to obtain a minority discount. 59 For example, in Estate of Murphy v. Commissioner,60
the decedent held a power of appointment over a controlling
the excess of the total value of a business over the value of the specifically identifiable
assets owned by the business. RICHARD A. BREALY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE FINANCE 834 (4th ed. 1991).

54 See Eric Thomas Carver, A Valuation Primer: Trends and Techniques for Estate

Planners, 77 MICH. B.J. 1304, 1304 (1998).
55

See Ward v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 78, 106 (1986). "The minority discount is
recognized because the holder of a minority interest lacks control over corporate policy, cannot direct the payment of dividends, and cannot compel a liquidation of corporate assets." [d.
66 See Ritter, supra note 44, at 193<.
57

See Ward, 87 T.C. at 108. The court looked to the Treasury Regulations and
found the gift tax regulations, as well as the estate tax regulations, rely on the willing
buyer and willing seller rule to determine value. Specifically the court looked at
regulation 25.2512-1, which states, "[t]he value of the property is the price at which
such property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell, and both having reasonable knowledge
of relevant facts." Treas. Reg. § 25.512-1 (as amended in 1992).
58

59
60

See Carver, 8,upra note 56, at 1305.
See W.
60 T.C.M. (CCH) 645 (1990).
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block of stock in a closely held corporation representing 51.41%
of the outstanding stock. 61 Eighteen days before her death, the
decedent made gifts of .88% of the stock to each of her two
children, thereby reducing her interest to 49.65%.62 The court
found that the sole purpose of this transfer was to obtain a minority discount for a controlling block of stock and disallowed
the discount. 63
b. Lack of Marketability Discounts
The lack of marketability discount recognizes that a stock interest in a closely held company has fewer potential purchasers than publicly traded stock. 64 In Estate of Andrews v. Commissioner,65 for example, the decedent owned stock in four
closely held corporations. 66 The court held that when the parties made no actual arm's-length sale with which to determine
fair market value, alternate methods must be used to value an
interest in a corporation. 67 Similarly, in Estate of Folks v.
Commissioner,66 the decedent owed a majority interest in a
closely held corporation. 69 The court found that stock that was
not freely and actively traded was subject to a "lack of marketability" discount equal to thirty-five percent of its appraised
value. 70 Courts have thus upheld a lack of marketability dis-

61

.

See id. at 645 (1990).
62 See id.
63

See id.

64 See Carver, supra note 56, at 1306. "A discount for lack of marketability is defined as a discount from the normative value arising because of the inherent difficulty
in the sale of an asset, requiring that the sale price between a willing buyer and a
willing seller be reduced." ld.
65 79 T.C. 938 (1982).

66

See id. at 938 (1982).

67 See id. at 940. "In the absence of arm's-length sales, the value of closely held
stock must determined indirectly by weighing the corporation's net worth, prospective
earning power, dividend-paying capacity, and other relevant factors." leI.
68 43 T.C. M. (CCH) 427 (1982).
69

See id. at 427 (1982).

70

See id.
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count in valuing both majority and minority interests in closely
71
held companies.
c. Liquidation Discounts
The cost of liquidating assets held by a corporation or partnership also reduces the value of an interest in the corporation
or partnership.72
For example, in Estate of Dougherty v.
Commissioner,73 the decedent owned one hundred percent of
the stock of a corporation. 74 The court allowed a discount for
the cost of liquidating the real estate held by a corporation. 76
d. Fractional Interest Discounts
The fractional interest discount recognizes that less than
one hundred percent of an asset is inherently less appealing to
a purchaser than the entire asset. 76 This fractional interest
discount differs from a minority discount in that a fractional
interest discount may apply even if more than fifty percent of
the asset is owned, as seen in Estate of Pillsbury v. Commissioner. 77 In Pillsbury, the decedent owned an undivided seventy-seven percent interest in real property. 78 The court recognized the effect of a fractional interest, even though it was a
majority interest, and allowed a discount for co-ownership.79
The court reasoned that a majority owner of the property
needs an agreement or consent of the minority owner in order
to exercise all of the rights ofownership.80 The effect ofa fractional interest discount is such that when two or more parties

71

See Carver, supra note 56, at 1306.

72

See id at 1307.

73

59 T.C.M (CCH) 772 (1990).

74 See id. at 772.
76 See id.
76

See Carver, supra note 56, at 1307.

77

64 T.C.M. (CCH) 284 (1992).

78 See
79

id. at 286.

See id. at 287.

80 See id.
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own property as co-tenants all of the owners have equal rights
of possession. 81 Consequently an owner who holds less than a
fifty percent interest may therefore restrict the actions of an
owner of a majority interest.82 This problem of concurrent
ownership reduces the value of the shared interests and thus
gives rise to a fractional interest discount.83

B.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF VALUATION DISCOUNTS

In general, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") does not
endorse valuation discounts.84 In fact, the IRS has fervently
and consistently argued against their use in Tax Court because
they can reduce tax liabilities of estates so dramatically.85 Beginning in 1940 with Hooper v. Commissioner,86 however, the
Tax Court has frequently allowed the use of valuation disS7
counts.

1. Estate of Bright v. United States -An Attempt to Strike
Down Valuation Discounts on the Transfer of Closely Held
Stock

In Estate of Bright v. United States,88 a seminal case in federal estate taxation, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit rejected the IRS's attempt to strike down a valuation discount on the transfer of stock in a closely held group of

SI

See Carver, supra note 56, at 1307. Each co-tenant has the right to equal use
and possession of the property. See id.
S2 See id.
83

See id.

84 For an example of the Internal Revenue Service's argument against minority interest discounts on corporate stock see Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999,
1001 - 1002 (5th Cir. 1980) and infra part II.B.l. For an example of the Service's position on fractional interest discounts see Estate of Propstra v. U.S., 680 F.2d 1248, 1251
(9th Cir. 1982) and infra notes 135 - 148 and accompanying text.
85 See Ritter, supra note 44, at 193.
88

41 B.T.A. 114 (1940).

S7

See Ritter, supra note 44, at 193.

88

658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol30/iss3/8
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89

corporations. In so doing, the court held that stock owned in
part or in full by one spouse prior to death could not be attributed to the surviving spouse for purposes of valuing the property for the transfer tax. so Rather, the stock transferred by
the deceased spouse should be valued independently of any
stock held by the surviving spouse. 91
In Bright, a husband and wife owned fifty-five percent of
the stock of an affiliated group of corporations as community
property.92 The wife, who predeceased her husband, had devised her half, 27.5% of the stock, to a trust for the benefit of
her children with the husband named as trustee. 93 This devise
was subject to a transfer tax. 94 The value of the 27.5% of stock,
however, could not be calculated on the basis of recent sales of
the stock because the stock was not publicly traded. 95 Thus,
the estate used an appraised fair market value and then
claimed a fifty percent discount due to lack of liquidity and
unmarketability of the minority interest. 96 The IRS disagreed
with the discount and assessed additional tax and interest of
more than $3,000,000 upon the estate. 97
The estate paid the deficiency and instituted a suit against
the IRS for a refund. 98 The district court held in favor of the

89 See id. The Bright decision is important because it is the first appellate decision
to reject the IRS's argument of family attribution. Subsequent decisions have relied
on Bright to allow minority discounts. See id.
90 See id at 1005.
91 See id.

See Estate of Bright, 658 F.2d at 1000.
See id.

92

9S

94

See I.R.C. § 2001(a).

95 See Estate of Bright, 658 F.2d 999, 1000 (5th Cir. 1980). The remajnjng forty-five
percent of the stock not held by the decedent and her husband was owned by not more
than four individuals with one person owning thirty percent. See id.

96 See id. at 1008. In this case, an expert witness established the value of the stock.
The dissent points out the value of the 27.5% interest was placed at $4,402,970 and a
discount of fifty percent was used to reduce this to $2,201,485. See id. at 1000.
97 See id. at 1000.
98

See id. at 1000.
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estate and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed. 99 During the appeal, the IRS agreed that the
property to be valued was the property actually transferred,
not the interest in the property held by the decedent before
death or by the legatee after death.loo Nevertheless, the IRS
argued that the actual property in this case was an undivided
one-half interest in a controlling fifty-five percent block of
stock as opposed to the 27.5% interest in the corporation. 101
Accordingly, the IRS argued that the proper valuation method
would be to assign a value to the whole controlling block and
then use one-half of that amount as the value of the amount
transferred. lOS This characterization would result not only in
loss of the fifty percent minority interest discount, but would
also give rise to a premium, and a subsequent increase in
value, because of the husband's ability to control the corporation through ownership of more than fifty percent of the
stock. lOS
The Fifth Circuit Court disagreed· with this position, noting
that under the community property laws of Texas, property is
subject to partition at the request of either the estate or the
surviving spouse. 104 Consequently, because the estate had no
way to prevent the conversion of the controlling block into two

99 See

Estate of Bright, 658 F.2d at 999.

100 See ill. at 1001. This concept was established in United States v. Land, 303 F.2d
170 (5th eir. 1962). In Land the decedent owned a partnership interest that was subject to a restrictive agreement that depressed the value of the interest. The restriction
expired on the death of the decedent. The court held the restriction did not affect the
value of the interest for estate tax purposes because the property is valued at the
instant of death and at that time the restriction was no longer effective. See Land, 303
F.2d 170.
101

See Estate of Bright, 658 F.2d at 1001.

102 See id. This would completely eliminate the minority discount because by definition a minority discount is not allowed when more than fifty percent of the stock is
owned. See id.
103 See id.

104 See

ill.
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parts each holding a 27.5% interest, the estate's interest was
limited to the value of a single 27.5% interest. l05
Attempting to find another way to strike down the discount,
the IRS argued for the application of the family attribution
principle, which gives constructive ownership to one family
member of stock actually owned by another member. 106 The
IRS reasoned that because the husband and wife owned the
stock as a control block during their lives and because the husband continued to control the entire block after her death, he
107
would not sell the estate's shares as a minority interest.
Under this reasoning, the transferred stock should be valued
as part of the fifty-five percent block, thus eliminating the dis108
count.
The Fifth Circuit Court rejected the government's family attribution argument for three reasons. 109 First, case law suggested that the principle was inapplicable. 110 For example, in
Estate of Lee v. Commissioner,1l1 a husband and wife owned, as
community property, most of the stock in a closely held corporation and upon the death of the wife, the stock passed to the
husband. l12 The court held that the transferred stock was to be
valued as a block separate from the shares owned by the hus-

105 See Estate of Bright, 658 F.2d at 1001. The court cited Estate of Lee v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 860 (1978), as support for this position. In Lee, a husband and wife
each owned, as community property, eighty percent of the common stock and one
hundred percent of the preferred stock of a corporation. The court found that upon the
death of the wife, her estate held forty percent of the common and fifty percent of the
preferred stock. Icl. (citing Estate of Lee, 69 T.C. at 874).
106 See id.

107 See id. at 1002. To support the idea of the estate continuing to have control of
the stock after death of the devisee, the government relied on the fact that the husband was the executor of the estate and trustee. The fiduciary duty from such a position, presumably, prevented him from partitioning the stock and reducing its value.
See id.
108 See Estate of Bright, 658 F.2d at 1002.
109 See id.
110
See id.
111

69 T.C. 860 (1978).

112 See Estate

of Bright, 658 F.2d at 1002 (citing Estate of Lee, 69 T.C. at 874).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2000

15

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 8

694 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:3

band. us Similarly, in Estate of Heppenstall v. Commissioner,ll4
the taxpayer owned 2,310 shares, representing more than fifty
percent of the stock in a family corporation. 115 He made gifts of
three hundred shares each to his wife and three children for a
total transfer of 1,200 shares. u6 The Tax Court allowed a discount, reasoning that while the donor no longer held a controlling share, he made gifts of less than fifty percent and thus did
not convey control to any single donee.117 Likewise, in Estate
of Phipps v. Commissioner,U8 the taxpayer made gifts of stock
to several family members and argued for family aggregation1l9
on the theory that, when combined, the gifts represented so
large a portion of the corporation that a blockage discount applied. 12O Consistent with other family aggregation cases, the
Phipps court held that each gift should be valued separately.12l
Finally, in Whitemore v. Fitzpatrick/22 the taxpayer, who
owned all 820 shares of a corporation, made gifts of 200 shares
to each of his three sons. l28 The court held that gifts to separate donees should be valued separately and thus a minority
discount applied. 124

ll3

See ill. (citing Estate of Lee, 69 T.C. at 874).

114

8 T.C.M. (CCH) 136 (1949).

115 See Estate of Bright, 658 F.2d at 1003 (citing Estate of Heppenstall v. Commissioner, 8 T.C.M. (CCH) (1949».
116
See ill .

117 See
11S

ill.

127 F.2d 214 (10th Cir. 19(2).

119 The terms "family aggregation" and "family attribution" have essentially the
same meaning. See Estate of Bright, 658 F.2d at 1004 (citing Estate of Phipps v.
Commissioner, 127 F.2d 214 (10th Cir. 19(2».

120 See Estate of Bright, 658 F.2d at 1004. A blockage discount refers to the situation that occurs when a single person holds so large a share of the stock that to sell
the stock would have a depressing effect on the price. See CCH, Federal Tax Service §
0:2.40.

121 See Estate of Bright, 658 F.2d at 1004 (citing Estate of Phipps, 127 F.2d 214).
122

127 F. Supp. 710 (D. Conn. 1954).

128 See Estate of Bright, 658 F.2d at 1004 (citing Whitemore v. Fitzpatrick, 127 F.
Supp. 710 (D. Conn. 1954».
124 [d.
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The second reason the Fifth Circuit Court rejected the principle of family attribution is because it is inconsistent with
Treasury Regulations and the willing buyer-seller rule contained therein. l25 Regulation 20.2031-1(b) states that when
determining fair market value one must look to the price at
which the property would change hands between a willing
buyer and seller when neither is coerced to act and both have
knowledge of all relevant facts. l28 Under this scenario, the
willing seller is not the actual seller, but rather a hypothetical
seller who cannot be assumed to own property other than that
which is the subject of the valuation. l27 This idea is supported
by the concept that the estate tax is a tax on the transfer of
property at death and that the valuation of property transferred is determined at the moment of death.128 "It would be
strange indeed if the estate value of a block of stock would vary
depending on the legatee to whom it was devised. ,,128
The third and final reason the court rejected the family attribution principle was to maintain a stable and predictable
body of law. 130 This stability is especially important in tax law
because of the widespread reliance on established principles

125

See id. at 1005 (citing Treas. Reg. 20.2031·1(b) (as amended in 1965».

126

See Treas. Reg. 20.2031·1(b). "The fair market value is the price at which the
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither
being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of
relevant facts." [d.
127 See Estate of Bright, 658 F. 2d at 1005. If the willing seller were assumed to be
the actual estate it would be reasonable to assume that all of the stock would be sold
as a block in order to reap the additional profit that a controlling interest is worth. If
the willing buyer is assumed to be the actual legatee, who already owns a portion of
the stock, it is reasonable to assume the buyer would be willing to pay a premium to
obtain a controlling interest. The hypothetical seller·buyer rule, moreover, requires
that property already in the hands or the buyer or seller must be ignored for valuation
purposes. See id.
.
128 See id. at 1006. Here the court once again states the value is based on the interest that is actually transferred, not on what was owned by the decedent before
death or what was owned by the surviving spouse after death. See id.
129 d
L .
130 See Estate of Bright, 658 F.2d at 1006. This policy important in tax law because
taxpayers rely on established principles to plan their affairs. See id.
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when planning a taxpayer's affairS.lSl Consequently, the
Bright court concluded that family attribution should not apply
to stock for estate valuation purposes. 182
The IRS responded to the Bright holding by issuing Revenue Ruling 81-253 in which it announced non-acquiescence. l33
The Ruling stated that, despite the outcome in Bright, the IRS
would not allow minority discounts with respect to transfers
between family members unless it found evidence of family
discord or other factors indicating that a family could not act
't 184
as a urn.
2. Estate of Propstra v. United States - Congressional Intent
With Respect to Valuation Discounts and Aggregation of Holdings
In Estate of Propstra v. United States,tS5 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit clarified the holding in
Bright when it analyzed the language of the Treasury Regulations in its attempt to determine the intent of Congress with
respect to family aggregation rules. lss In Propstra, the husband died owning an undivided one-half community property
interest in several parcels of real estate, all of which passed to
his surviving wife who owned the other one-half interest. ls7 On
the husband's estate tax return, the estate claimed a fifteen
percent discount for lack of marketability.lss The government
disputed the discount and argued that the taxpayer must show

181

See ill.
ee ill .

182S

133

See Rev. RuI. 81-253, 1981-2 C.B. 187. H tQe Internal Revenue Service disagrees with a court ruling it announces "non-acquiescence." This means the IRS will
follow the ruling only for the specific taxpayer whose case resulted in the ruling, but
will continue to follow. what it considers to be the correct interpretation of the law
when dealing with all other taxpayers. See Raabe, supra note 11, at 94.
184
1311

See Rev. RuI. 81-253, 1981-2 C.B. 187.
680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982).

188 See

ill. at1251.

137 See

id. at 1250.

ISS

See ill.
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that the two interests are likely to be sold separately before
claiming the discount. 189 In support of this argument, the IRS
stated that, under the unity of ownership principle,14O it could
reasonably assume that the interest held by the estate would
eventually be sold with the other undivided interest.141
The Ninth Circuit, as had the Fifth Circuit in Bright, looked
to the definition of fair market value in Treasury Regulation
20.2031-1(b) and decided that its language did not require application of the unity of ownership rules. 142 Congress, rather
than explicitly ordering the application of unity of ownership
rules as it had done in other areas of tax law, simply was silent. l43 The Propstra court reasoned that because the statute
lacked specific language requiring family aggregation, it would
not assume that Congress intended the family attribution
rules to apply in estate tax situations. l44 Consequently, the
Ninth Circuit in Propstra rejected the government's argument
for using the objective standard of a hypothetical buyer and
seller in order to avoid uncertainties involved in forcing executors to make inquiries into the feelings, attitudes and anticipated behavior of those holding undivided interests in property. 146
In 1993, after further consideration of Ruling 81-253 and in
light of several other cases rejecting the family aggregation
.
147 In't
. . Ie, 146 the IRS revok ed 1't non-acqwescence.
pnnClp
1 s

139

.

See id. at 1251.

140 See Estate of Propstra, 680 F.2d at 1251. The court uses the term "unity of OWDership principle.- This seems have the same meaning as "family attribution." See ill
at 1251 n.4.
141 See ill.

142 See ill.
143

See Estate of Propstra, 680 F.2d at 1251. The court refers to sections 267, 318
and 544 of the Internal Revenue Code dealing with income taxation not estate taxes.
See id.
144 See ill.

146

See id. at 1252.

148

See Estate of Andrews v. United States, 79 T.C. 938 (1982); and Estate of Lee v.
Commissioner, 69 T.C. 938 (1982).
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stead, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 93-12, which states that
family relationships will not be considered when valuing gifts
of stock in closely held corporations. 148

3. Estate of Bonner v. United States - An Analysis of the Special Rules for Qualified Terminable Interest Property Trusts
In Estate of Bonner v. United States,149 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated a rule regarding
the availability of discounts on QTIP property.l60 The Bonner
court held that, for valuation purposes, QTIP property is not
merged with other property oWned by the decedent. lSI Specifically, the court held that an estate could take a valuation discount on a decedent's estate tax return even though a portion
of the decedent's property was held in a trust and the remainder owned outright. 152 In so holding, the court focused on the
fact that the decedent, who held only an income interest in a
QTIP trust, lacked control over the final disposition of the
property. 163

Mr. Bonner died in 1989 owning a 62.5% undivided interest
in a ranch located in Texas. lM He also owned in fee simple a
fifty percent undivided community property interest in real
property located in New Mexico and a fifty percent undivided
community property interest in a pleasure boat. l66 The remaining 37.5% interest in the ranch and the other fifty percent
interest in both the New Mexico property and boat was owned
147

See Rev. Rul. 81-253, 1981-2 C.B. 187.

148 See Revenue Ruling 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202. In determining the value of a gift; of
a minority block of stock in a closely-held corporation, the block should be valued for
gift tax purposes without regard to the family relationship of the donee to other
shareholders. See id.
149 84 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 1996).

160 See id. at 198.
lSI See id.
152 See

id. at 197.

163 See

id. at 198.

154

See Estate of Bonner, 84 F.3d at 197.
id.

166 See
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by a trust established by the will of his predeceased wife. l66
The trust was a QTIP trust under I.R.C. section 2056(b)(7)157
and thus was not subject to estate tax upon the death of the
wife. l66 Rather, the court held that it was included in the taxable estate of the husband as the surviving spouse. 159 Consequently, Mr. Bonner's taxable estate included one hundred
percent of the undivided interests in the three properties. l60
In calculating the estate tax to be assessed, however, the
estate took a forty-five percent discount based on the decedent's fractional undivided interest. lSI The representative of
the estate argued that the decedent owned only a portion of the
property; the other portion was owned by the QTIP trust and
was only included in the taxable estate so that it would not
escape taxation. 162 The government, on the other hand, argued against thi~ discount, claiming that the interests held by
the QTIP trust and the interest held by the husband merged at
the time of death, thereby resulting in complete ownership of
163
the property.
Relying on its decision in Bright, the Fifth Circuit held that
QTIP property is not merged with other property owned by the
l64
decedent. Instead, QTIP property must be valued separately
from all other property.l65 The proper value then is the value
at which that separate property would change hands between
a willing buyer and a willing seller.166 The court analyzed the
hypothetical seller rule and found that family attribution,

166 See

id. Ms. Bonner died in 1986. See ill.

157
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
158
See Estate of Bonner, 84 F.3d at 197.
159 See id .
160
161

See id.
See id.
ee id .

162S

163
164

165
166

See Estate of Bonner, 84 F.3d at 198.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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which relies on the identity of the seller as the legatee, cannot
control the value of the asset because the valuation is a measure of the interest that is held at the moment of death, not the
interest held by the decedent before death or the legatee after
167
death .
The Bonner court also held that the estate of a decedent
should be taxed on only those assets whose disposition the decedent directs and controls.l68 In Bonner, the predeceased wife
controlled the disposition of the property from the grave by the
use of the trust. l69 While the husband was entitled to the income for his life, the wife ultimately chose the final recipients
of the property.l70 Neither the husband nor the estate had any
control over the disposition even though the husband's estate
was required to pay the tax on the property.l?1 This lack of
control gives rise to a fractional interest discount.172
After Bonner and Revenue Ruling 93-12, the question of
family aggregation appears to be settled and property held in
trust will be valued independently of other property held by
the decedent or by the beneficiaries.

III.

FACTS OF NOWELL V. COMMISSIONER

During their marriage, Mr. and Ms. Nowell owned and ac173
quired substantial interests in securities and real estate. On
April 20, 1990, Mr. Nowell formed the A.L. Nowell Trust and
funded it with his community property interest in one-half of

167 See

id.

166

See Estate of Bonner, 84 F.3d at 199.
id.
170 See id.
169 See

171 See id. at 198. Some QTIP trusts give the beneficiary a power of appointment
over the a6sets. This was not the case in the Bonner trust. It i6 not clear whether the
court would have allowed a discount if the husband had this control. See id.
172
173

See Estate of Bonner, 84 F.3d at 199.
•

See Nowell v. Commt8sioner, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1239, 1240 (1999).
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the securities and real estate.174 Upon his death on April 26,
1990, the trust property was transferred into three separate
trusts: two Qualified Terminable Interest Property Trusts
("QTIP trusts,,)1711 and a trust entitled The Decedent's Trust. 176
The income generated by the property in the QTIP trusts
passed to Ms. Nowell for her life with the remainder to be distributed to the heirs selected by Mr. Nowell.177 David Prechel
("Mr. Prechel") and Diane Prechel ("Ms. Prechel"), Ms. Nowell's grandchildren from a prior marriage, were these remainder beneficiaries. 178 The trust named Ms. Nowell and Mr. Prechel as cotrustees. 179
Six days before Mr. Nowell's death, Ms. Nowell formed her
own revocable trust, the Ethel S. Nowell Trust, with her own
community property interest. ISO Mr. Prechel and Ms. Prechel
were the remainder beneficiaries of this trust as well. 181
In 1991, Ms. Nowell and Mr. Prechel formed two limited
partnerships, Prechel Farms Limited Partnership (PFLP) and
the ESN Group Limited Partnership (ESNGLP), both funded
by the assets of Ms. Nowell's revocable trust, the QTIP trusts
and The Decedent's Trust. 182 The partnership agreements for
both partnerships provided that no assignee of a limited part-

174 See id. at 1240. Community property states require community property assets,
as opposed to separate property, to be distributed equally between the parties or the
party'8 e8tate on the death of a party or the dissolution of the marriage. All assets,
except property acquired by gift, bequest, device or descent, generally are community
property if the asset is acquired during marriage. See JESSE DUKEMINIER AND
STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 472 (6th ed. 2000).
1711 One of the QTIP Trusts was an exempt trust and one was non-exempt. A discussion of the distinction is beyond the scope of this note. See supra notes 15 - 172
and accompanying text.
176 See Estate of Nowell, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1240.
177 See id.
178

S ee

id

.

179 See id.
ISO

See id. at 1240.
181
See Estate ofNowell, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1241.
182 See id.
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nership interest would become a limited partner unless the
general partners consented to the assignee's admission as a
limited partner. ISS
The following charts indicate the pre-discounted value of
property contributed to the partnerships and the various ownership interests therein. 1M

ISS See id. at 1243. The distinction between an assignee and a partner is important
because. in general. an assignee cannot exercise the normal rights of a partner. An
assignee bas only the right to distribution of income from the partnership. An assignee cannot interfere in the management of the business or require any information
or account of partnership transactions. 59A AM. JUR. 2d Partnerships § 506 (1987).
1M

See Estate ofNowell. 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1240.
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Prechel Farms
Limited Partnership
Value of
Contrihuted
Property
Partners
Ethel S. Nowell Trust

Interest
in Profit
and
Loss

Type of
Interest

$1,386,500

60.41% Limited

A L. Nowell Decedent's
Trust

$300,000

13.07% Limited

A L. Nowell QTIP Trust - 1

$408,000

17.78% General

A L. Nowell QTIP Trust - 2

$200,000

8.72% Limited

$500

0.02% General

David Prechel
Total

$2,295,000

100%

ESNGroup
Limited Partnership
Value of
Contrihuted
Property
Partners·
Ethel S. Nowell Trust

Interest Type of
in Profit Interest
and
Loss

$75,000

13.04% Limited

A L. Nowell Decedent's
Trust

$300,000

52.17% General

A L Nowell QTIP Trust - 2

$200,000

34.79% Limited

Total
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Upon Ms. Nowell's death in 1992, by the terms of the various trusts, the 99.98% interest in PFLP not owned by Mr. Prechel passed to him and all interests in the ESNGLP passed to
Ms. Prechel. 185 The value of these transfers were discounted at
fifty or sixty-five percent on Ms. Nowell's estate tax return to
account for lack of control and lack of marketability. 186
The following chart lists the values reported on the federal
estate tax return and the discounts claimed. 187
Type of
Interest

Partner
PFLP in Ethel S.
Nowell Trust
ESNGLP in Ethel
S.
Nowell Trust
PFLPinQTIP
Trust - 1
PFLPin QTIP
Trust - 2
ESNGLPin
QTIP Trust - 2

Value of
Property
Before
Discounts

186 See

Discount

Limited

$851,714

$298,100 65%

Limited

$63,800

$31,900 50%

General

$250,600

$125,300 50%

Limited

$122,857

$43,000 65%

Limited

$170,000

$85,000 50%

$1,458,971

185 See,'d.

Value
Claimed
on
Return

$583,300

at 1241.

id.

187 See id. The property in The Decedent's Trust was not included in the gross estate of Ms. Nowell, probably because it was a credit shelter or bypass trust. Unlike
QTIP trusts, credit protection trusts are not included in the estate of a decedent who
holds only a life interest in the property. See Esperti, supra note 15, at 116.
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IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The IRS challenged these discounts and determined that
the value of the Ethel S. Nowell Trust interests should be increased by $577,300 and the value of the QTIP trusts should be
188
These adjustments, along with an
increased by $272,404.
adjustment for a small income tax refund, resulted in a deficiency assessment and an additional $342,688 in estate
189
taxes.
Mr. Prechel, as the personal representative for Ms. Nowell's
estate, brought this action in United States Tax Court to have
the deficiency assessment reversed. ISO Both the IRS and Mr.
Prechel moved for partial summary judgment and both motions were granted in part and denied in part. 19l The case was
subsequently scheduled for trial regarding the amount of discounts allowed, but the IRS agreed that no additional tax
would be assessed. l92 Thus, the ruling on motions for summary
judgment concluded the case without a determination as to the
actual dollar amount of the discounts that were allowed. 193
V. COURT'S ANALYSIS

In Nowell, the tax court analyzed and decided two separate
issues. l94 The first issue was whether the various partnership
interests held by the estate should be valued independently of
188

See Estate ofNowell, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1241.
189 See id.

ISO See

id at 1240.

191 See id at 1243 - 1244. The opinion only covers the motions for summary judgment. See id.
192 See Telephone Interview with Susan Smith, of Olsen-Smith Ltd., in Phoenix,
Ariz. (October 8, 1999).

193 See Telephone Interview with Susan Smith, of Olsen-Smith Ltd., in Phoenix,
Ariz. (October 8, 1999).
194 See

Estate of Nowell v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1239, 1242 (1999).
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each other or whether they should be merged. 195 The court
held that the interests should be valued separately.l96 The second issue was whether the interests that passed at death were
partnership interests or assignee interests. 197 An assignee has
the right to distribution of income but none of the normal
rights of a partner. 19S The court examined state law and concluded that they were assignee interests. l99
A. MERGER OF INTERESTS

The Nowell court, relying on its ruling in Estate of Mellinger v. Commissioner,200 held that the interests should not be
merged, but rather should be viewed as separate fractional
interests held by the decedent at death.201 In Mellinger, the
decedent died owning 2,460,580 shares of publicly traded
stock.202 Her estate also included another 2,460,580 shares of
the same stock held in a QTIP trust.203 Relying on the rulings
in Bright, Propstra, and Bonner, the Mellinger court found that
property in a QTIP trust does not actually pass to or from the
second decedent.204 Thus, at no time does the second decedent

5ee id.
196 See id.
195

197

See id. at 1242.

198

See 59A AM. JUR. 2d Partnerships § 506 (1987).

199 See Estate ofNowell, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1243.

200 112 T.C. 26 (1999). Interestingly, the same judge decided both Mellinger, and
Nowell. Both opinions were issued on the same day. The Mellinger court relied on the
rulings in Bright, Propstra, and Bonner to reach its conclusion. See id.

See Estate of Nowell, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1242. This ruling allowed the estate to
value each partnership interest as if it stood alone. Each interest was thus allowed a
discount for lack of control and lack of marketability, despite the fact that, taken as a
whole, the pieces represented 99.98% of the underlying property. See id.
201

202

•

See Estate of MellInger, 112 T.C. at 27.

203 See id. The QTIP trust was a testamentary trust created on the death of her
husband. The stock contributed to the QTIP trust consisted of the husband's one-half
interest in 4,921,160 shares held as community property by the husband and wife. See
id.
204 See id. at 35. QTIP property actually passes on the death of the first spouse to
the designated heirs. The surviving spouse has only a life estate in the property. A
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control or have power of distribution over the shares held in a
QTIP trust. 206 Consequently, the Mellinger court refused to
require the two blocks of stock aggregated for valuation purposes even though the combined ownership exceeded fifty percent of the corporation.206
The Nowell court reached the same conclusion after an additional analysis of Section 2044 of the I.R.C.207 This section
requires only that QTIP property be included in the estate, at
its fair market value, for purposes of determining the transfer
tax.206 It does not require, however, that the decedent aggregate QTIP assets with other assets owned at death. 209 The
court contrasted this with sections 267, 318, and 544, which
specifically require aggregation of ownership for various in210
come tax purposes.
The explicit nature of these sections illustrate that Congress could have provided for family aggregation, but did noe11 By reverse implication then, because Congress was silent on the issue of family aggregation for QTIP
property, Congress did not intend for QTIP property to be aggregated with other interests held by the decedent.212
To rebut this theory, the IRS urged that it is precisely because QTIP trust property is included in the taxable estate

life estate is extinguished on the death of the holder and normally is not included in
the estate of the second decedent. QTIP property is an exception to this rule and is
simply an election by the taxpayers to include the value of the property only in the
estate of the second spouse to die. See supra notes 15 - 172 and accompanying text.
205 See Estate of Mellinger, 112 T.C. at 36.
206

•

See ill at 33 - 35.

207 See I.R.C. § 2044(a). "The value of the gross estate shall include the value of
any property to which this section applies in which the decedent had a qualifying
interest for life." ld. The code then goes on to say that this section applies to any
property for which a QTIP election was made. See ill.
20B
See Estate of Nowell, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1242.
209

•

See ill.

210 See ill. Sections 267, 318, and 544 generally require related parties to treat
their separate holdings 88 a single block and restrict the ability to deduct losses resulting from transfers between related parties. I.R.C. §§ 267, 318, and 544 (1999).
211

See Estate of Nowell, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1242.

212 See ill.
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that Ms. Nowell should be treated as the owner of the property
at her death for purposes of valuation. 218 The court found not
only that the IRS had used the same line of reasoning in Mellinger but that the facts in Nowell bore enough similarity to
warrant another rejection of the IRS's argument. 214
B. AsSIGNEE OR PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS

In addressing the second issue, the court looked at the
transfer of both general and limited partnership interests and
afforded each a different treatment based on specific language
in the partnership agreements. 2111 The partnership agreements, executed by Ms. Nowell and Mr. Prechel for both Prechel Farms Limited Partnership and the ESN Group Limited
Partnership, provided that an assignee of a limited partnership interest could not become a limited partner unless all
general partners consented to the assignee's admission as a
limited partner. 218 The IRS argued that this limitation should
be disregarded because Mr. and Ms. Prechel, as assignees, held
one hundred percent of the general partnership interests and,
therefore, could admit themselves as partners. 217 The court
relied on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Propstra, which holding that, "[t]he property to be valued for estate tax purposes is
that which the decedent actually transfers at death rather
than the interest held by the decedent before death, or that
held by the legatee after death. ,,21S The court thus refused to
consider the interests held by Mr. and Ms. Prechel after Ms.

218 See

id.

214 See

id.

216 S

ee id. at 1243.

See Estate of Nowell, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1241. The distinction between an assignee and a partner is important because, in general, an assignee cannot exercise the
normal rights of a partner. An assignee has only the right to distribution of income
from the partnership. An 88signee cannot interfere in the management of the business or require any information or account of partnership transactions. 59A AM. JUR.
2d Partnerships § 506 (1987).
218

217
21S

See Estate ofNowell, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1243.

See id. {citing Estate of Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248,1251 (9th Cir.

1982».
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Nowell's death and stated that it must use the objective standard of a hypothetical buyer and seller to determine if the general partners would elect to admit the heirs as new partners,
219
rather than the actual facts.
Under this objective standard
the identity of the general partners cannot be assumed to be
that of the assignees. 22O
The Nowell court next addressed the effect of state law on
valuation of the limited partnership interests. 221 In determining the proper valuation, a court must first apply state law to
determine the nature of the property and then apply federal
law to determine the proper taxation of that property.222 Under
Arizona law,223 a partner in a limited partnership may transfer
to an assignee only the right to receive distributions of cash or
other property.224 He or she may not transfer the rights and
powers of a partner, unless the partnership agreement allows
for such a transfer. 225 The agreements for both the Prechel
Farms Limited Partnership and the ESN Group Limited Partnership did not allow such a transfer. Rather, the agreements
stated:
A person who acquires one or more units but who is not
admitted as a substituted limited partner . . . (1) shall
be entitled only to allocations and disbursements with
respect to such units in accordance with these articles,
(2) shall have no right to any information or accounting
of the affairs of the partnership, (3) shall not be entitled
to inspect the books and records of the partnership, (4)
shall not have any of the rights of a general partner or a

219
220

See id.
•

See id. This ruling allowed the estate to take further discounts on top of the
discounts already allowed for lack of control and marketability. See icl.
221
222

22S
224

See Estate of NoweU, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1243.
See id.

Ms. Nowell died as a resident of Arizona. See id at 1240.
See id at 1243.

225

See id. Arizona law provides, "An assignment entitles the assignee to receive, to
the extent assigned, only the distribution to which the assignor would be entitled.·
ARIz. REv. STAT. § 29-340 (1999).
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limited partner under the act or these articles, but (5)
shall be subject to the obligations of a unit holder under
these articles ... 226
From this language the court concluded that the rights and
powers of the limited partnership interests passed to Mr. and
Ms. Prechel as assignee interests, and should be valued as
such, rather than as full partnership interests.227
The court, however, refused to allow the same treatment for
the assignment of the general partnership interest. 22B Originally, Mr. Prechel held a 0.02% general partnership interest in
the Prechel Farms Limited Partnership.229 At Ms. Nowell's
death, Mr. Prechel inherited another 17.78 % of this general
partnership interest, the rights of which were unrestricted under the partnership agreement.2S0 Consequently, the court held
that without the approval requirements associated with the
limited partnership interests the general partnership interest
automatically treated the beneficiary as a partner. 281 For this
reason, the court held that the partnership interest should be
valued as a general partnership interest.282 Accordingly, the
discount available on the interest should be reduced because

226

Estate of Nowell, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) atl241.

227 See ill. at 1243. The opinion, however, offered no guidance on how the value
&bould be determined.
226 See ill.
229 See
230

id. at124O.

See Estate ofNowell, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1240. The agreement stated, '"[a] transferee of units from a general panner hereunder shall be admitted as a general partner
with respect to such units if (a) at the time of such transfer, such transferee is otherwise a general partner ...... See id. at 1241.

281 See id. at 1243. This was an unfortunate decision for the beneficiary because he
contributed only $500 for his less than one-percent general partnership interest. This
small amount resulted in the loss of a significant discount on an interest with an
original contribution value of $408,000. See id.
282

See ill. Unfortunately the published opinion again offers no guidance on the
proper valuation of this interest.
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general partners have management and control rights in the
partnership.2S3
The court granted partial summary judgment to the estate
of Ms. Nowell by finding the limited partnership interests
passed to Mr. and Ms. Prechel as assignee interests. 2M However, the court also granted partial summary judgment to the
IRS by finding the general partnership interests passed as full
partnership interests. 235
VI. CRITIQUE

The analysis in Nowell was correct, based on the Internal
Revenue Code and case law. On the issue of family aggregation, courts have consistently held that, for valuation purposes,
neither what the transferor held before the transfer nor what
the recipient held after the transfer should be the basis for the
valuation.236 Rather, the calculation must only consider the
interest that was actually transferred. This applies equally to
the question of assignee interests versus partnership interests.
Even though an assignee owns all of the outstanding partnership interests and can easily vote to convert his or her assignee
interests to partnership interests, the IRS cannot be assumed
he or she will do so. The court was correct in holding that
when an interest in a limited partnership is transferred and
the partnership agreement limits a transferee to an assignee
interest, the other holdings of that transferee are not considered for valuing the interest transferred.
This result is a windfall for estate planners because it establishes a bright-line formula by which very large valuation
discounts can be obtained using relatively simple estate planning techniques. These techniques allowed a husband and

233

2M
235

See supra notes 42 - 83 and accompanying text.
See Estate of Nowell, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1243.
•

See id. at 1240 - 1241.

236 See Estate of Bonner v. Commissioner, 84 F.3d 196, 198 (5th Cir. 1996); Estate
of Propstra v. Commissioner, 680 F.2d 1248, 1252 (9th Cir.1982); Estate of Bright v.
Commissioner, 658 F.2d 999, 1006 (5th Cir. 1980).
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wife, with an estate worth over two million dollars, to effectively hold property for their entire lives and pass the entire
estate on to their intended heirs with reduced tax liability.
Although the court is silent on the actual value of the taxable
estate, the only property on which it reduced the valuation discount was the general partnership interest in PFLP held by
the A. L. Nowell QTIP Trust_1.237 Had the partners named the
A. L. Nowell Decedent's trust as the only general partner in
PFLP, the estate would have completely escaped estate tax
liability because this trust was not included in the taxable estate of Ms. Nowell and the remaining assets were valued at
less than the unified credit amount.
The key to using Nowell to develop a workable estate plan
is the proper application of the state law under which the
partnership is formed. Although only briefly mentioned in
Nowell, section 2704(b) of the Internal Revenue Code provides
that restrictions on transfers of an interest in partnerships
between family members will be disregarded for valuation
purposes unless the restriction is less than or equal to that
imposed by state law.238 In Nowell, the Arizona limited partnership law limited assignee rights to distribution of income
only.239 The partnership agreements in Nowell contained a
237 See Estate of Nowell v. COIllDllssloner,
. .
77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1239, 1243 (1999). The
court did not allow the general partnership interest held by the QTIP trust to be valued as an assignee interest. The discount claimed on the tax return was fifty percent
or $125,300. Although the opinion does not state the discount that was allowed it can
be presumed that some discount was allowed to account for the fractional interest
(17.78 %) that this partner held. Using the full fifty percent discount claimed the total
value of the estate was $583,300. The unified credit exempts the first $600,000 of
assets from estate tax so even a significant reduction in the discount would result in a
relatively small amount of asset value being subjected to tax. See id.
23B
See I.R.C. § 2704(b)
(1) For purposes of this subtitle if - there is a transfer of an interest in a
corporation or partnership to (or for the benefit ot) a member of the transferor's family, and the transferor and members of the transferor's family
hold, immediately before the transfer, control of the entity, any applicable
restriction shall be disregarded in determining the value of the transferred
interest. (2) ... The term restriction shall not include - any restriction imposed, or required to be imposed, by any federal or state law. Id.

239

ARIz. REv. STAT. § 29-340 (West 1999). "An assignment entitles the assignee to
receive, to the extent assigned, only the distribution to which the assignor would be
entitled." Id.
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similar restriction on assignee interests that was no greater
than the state law.240 This was critical in obtaining the maximum discount available. If the partnership agreement had
contained a restriction on the rights of a holder of an interest
greater than the controlling state law, the restriction would
have been disregarded for valuation purposes and the discount
would have been lost.
Given this ability to significantly reduce estate taxes, Congress may attempt to enact a prohibition on the use of valuation discounts. President Clinton's recent budget proposal contained such a restriction on the use of discounts on most family
limited partnerships. The bill, however, would still have allowed their use in active trades or businesses.241 The Republican-dominated House and Senate went to the opposite extreme
when it sent to the President a bill that would have eliminated
the estate tax entirely. President Clinton, as expected, vetoed
the bill. Nevertheless, with the present tax reduction goals of
the lawmakers, Congress probably will not place obstacles in
the path of those who seek to reduce taxes by judiciallyapproved means. Thus, Nowell's use of valuation discounts
appears to be a valid estate planning tool.
VII. CONCLUSION

The magnitude of the discounts allowed in Nowell and the
clear formula for obtaining those discounts provides estate
planners with a method to significantly reduce the estate tax
burden on families. A family limited partnership and a series
of QTIP trusts may be used to split up a family's assets so that
the sum of the parts are valued at far less than the whole.
Under the ruling in Bonner, and affirmed in Nowell, QTIP
trusts effectively divide the assets into fractional interests that
are not aggregated for valuation purposes, thus permitting the
use of the fractional interest discounts to reduce their value for
tax liabilities. The QTIP trusts can then be made limited
240

See Estate of Nowell, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1241.

241 See Lee A. Sheppard, The Need for Family Limited Partnership Legislation, 82
TAX NOTES TODAY 1095, 1095 (1999).
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partners in a limited partnership to which they contribute
their assets. In this partnership, the one general partner has
contributed very little and thus has a minimal interest. The
bulk of the remaining assets are acquired from limited partners who, although they have contributed much, hold only
limited partnership interests with no control over the business.
This lack of control allows for the discount. Consequently,
practitioners should draft partnership agreements so that any
assignees acquire full limited partnership interests only on
approval of the other partners. Thus, when transferees inherit
an interest, that interest will be only an assignee interest for
valuation purposes and the estate can obtain yet another discount. Under Nowell, this is permissible even if the transferees already own all the other outstanding interests in the
partnership and can easily convert the assignee interest to a
full partnership interest.
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